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ESSAY
BOUNDED RATIONALITY, PATERNALISM,
AND TRADEMARK LAW
Stacey Dogan*
ABSTRACT

We don't need behavioral economics to understand that
trademarks can shape consumer preferences in ways that have little to do with objectively measurable differences in product quality. Scholars, judgbs, economists, and policymakers have long recognized the tendency of strong marks to skew consumer decisions.
The concern lies not only in price effects but with the allocative
effects of encouraging investment in persuasive advertising, rather than product innovation or similar "productive" pursuits.
While informative advertising can benefit consumers, advertising
that creates artificial brand-based differences between otherwise
identical products appears not only costly to consumers but also
socially wasteful.
This Essay complements the rich-and growing-literature
considering the relationship between contemporary trademark
law and consumer welfare. Much of this literature focuses on the
harms that expansive trademark law poses to consumer interests
such as speech, autonomy, and product choice. This Essay considers the consumer/trademark relationship from a different perspective. It seeks to identify some of the cognitive mechanisms through
which trademarks, in collaboration with advertising, may skew
consumer decisions away from what rational self-interest might
suggest. Because these effects can occur even with narrowly*
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston
University School of Law. Thanks to participants in the University of Houston Law Center's
Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium for helpful comments,
and to Boston University School of Law for supporting my research.
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drawn trademark subject matter and scope, they deserve separate
attention. A better understanding of these effects may enable a
more informed conversation about whether we should worry about
them. It also might suggest legal, regulatory, or educational mechanisms to soften or counter some of the more pernicious effects of
trademarks without compromising consumer autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION

We don't need behavioral economics to understand that trademarks can shape consumer preferences in ways that have little to
do with objectively measurable differences in product quality.1
Scholars, judges, economists, and policymakers have long recog2
nized the tendency of strong marks to skew consumer decisions.
See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
1.
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1172-73 (1948) (explaining that market control depends
not on objective differences between products, but upon the perceived differences caused by
advertising).
2.
See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) ('The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function
of symbols.'); EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION 56, 61-62 (5th ed. 1946); Kurt Borchardt, Are Trademarks an Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEO. L.J. 245, 246 (1943); Brown, supra note 1, at 1187; Bartholomew Diggins,
Trade-Marks and Restraintsof Trade, 32 GEO. L.J. 113, 115 (1944). See generally Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 428 (1999) (explaining the effect
of trademarks on consumers' unconscious decision-making).
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While many factors contribute to this phenomenon, the power of
persuasive advertising, combined with the bounded rationality of
consumers, plays a potent role. The twentieth century witnessed
extraordinary growth in the use of psychological tools to shape people's desires, contributing to a culture of consumerism and brand
3
hegemony.
Critics have long fretted about the consumer harm that can
result from trademark-based product differentiation. 4 As a trial
judge wondered in 1928: "Why should a vendor be able to collect
from a purchaser, as a part of the purchase price, money which has
been spent in an effort to mislead that very purchaser in making
that very purchase?" 5 In particular, the judge balked at the idea
that consumers should pay higher prices for a branded version of
the exact same product based on their misimpression that the advertised version was superior. 6 The concern lies not only in the
consumer's over-payment but with the allocative effects of encouraging investment in persuasive advertising, rather than product
innovation or similar "productive" pursuits. 7 While informative
advertising can benefit consumers, advertising that creates artificial brand-based differences between otherwise identical products
8
appears not only costly to consumers but also socially wasteful.
Should the law worry about these tendencies of trademarks,
or should it view them as endemic (or even desirable) in any system that protects marks as indicators of source? 9 More fundamentally, should judges and lawmakers care if advertising shapes consumer preferences in ways that appear to diverge from what a

3.
See Katya Assaf, BrandFetishism, 43 CONN.L. REV. 85, 105, 107 (2009); Peter S.
Menell, 2014: Brand Totalitarianism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 787, 791 (2014); cf. Barton
Beebe, IntellectualProperty Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 810, 819-20
(2010) (discussing the psychological interplay between consumerism and the desire to distinguish oneself). See generally THE CENTURY OF THE SELF (BBC television broadcast Mar.
17, 2002) (exploring how psychological techniques were applied to influence consumer decisions during the twentieth century).
4.
See Am. Safety Razor Corp. v. Int'l Safety Razor Corp., 26 F.2d 108, 114 (D.N.J.
1928), rev'd, 34 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1929) (denouncing efforts to mislead consumers into paying more for an identical product).
Id.
5.
6.
Id. ("[Ilf the public knew the truth, it would buy that blade ... which is sold at
the smallest price,... its ignorance is costing it money without warrant every time it buys
a blade at any figure beyond the minimum.').
7.
See Brown, supra note 1, at 1169 ('If we consider first the total stream of production and consumption, persuasive advertising seems only to consume resources that might
be put to better use producing more goods and services.').
8. See id.
9.
See generally Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 263
(2013) (contending that consumers derive substantial utility from their hedonic experience
with marks, and that the law should embrace that phenomenon rather than resisting it).
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hypothetical "rational" actor would choose? 10 Does it matter
whether consumers derive measurable short-term pleasure from
acting on those preferences, and whether that pleasure endures or
reverses itself?1 How should we think about attempts to "correct"
such preferences-as regulation of competition, benign consumer
protection, or paternalistic meddling? 12 To what extent might
trademark doctrine play a role?
Trademark scholars have pondered these questions for over a
century, and have debated the extent to which trademark doctrine
should tolerate, resist, or even encourage the persuasive function
of marks.1 3 Legal scholars have also drawn from the literature of
marketing, psychology, and behavioral economics to demonstrate
the complexity of human decisions and to consider their implications for trademark law.1 4 Yet the trademark literature has not
fully explored whether particular systematic biases revealed by
these disciplines may reduce the benefits conveyed by trademarks
under the economic model. 15 In particular, psychological and economic researchers have identified a set of heuristics and biases
that influence human decisions in predictable (and predictably

10.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 72 (2008) ("FIfor all their virtues, markets often
give companies a strong incentive to cater to (and profit from) human frailties, rather than
to try to eradicate them or to minimize their effects.").
For a discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Colin F. Camerer, Wanting,
11.
Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience and Paternalism,73 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 98-99 (2006).
See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics:
12.
Its Origins,FatalFlaws, and Implicationsfor Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1088 (2012)
(warning that even limited paternalism can "pose a significant risk of reducing both our
welfare and our liberty"); cf. Laura A. Heymann, The Public'sDomain in Trademark Law:
A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 660 (2009) (exploring
trademark law from a Kantian approach to consumer autonomy, in which "[t]he value of
choice is not in what choice is ultimately made, but rather in the fact that the choice is
personal to the individual').
For an example of the latter, see Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasis of Trade13.
mark Protection,40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 830-31 (1927); see also Manta, supra note 9, at 263
(arguing that a trademark system must account for the hedonic utility derived by consumers when they use products of a certain brand); cf. Jeremy N. Sheff, The (Boundedly) Rational Basis of Trademark Liability, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 373-75 (2007)
(advocating a view of infringement law as a de-biasing mechanism).
14.
E.g., Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasionin Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV.
2020, 2032 (2005); Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm,
95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 92-93 (2009); Sheff, supra note 13, at 373-75.
15.
Cf. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 1044-45 (discounting the policy relevance of experimental findings of cognitive biases). In an important article, Jeremy Sheff
has advocated the use of behavioral economics as a justification for trademark protection.
See Sheff, supra note 13, at 334 (noting that trademark law should be understood as "designed... to accommodate and even harness non-rational human thought processes, rather
than suppress or eradicate them."). This Essay considers non-rational behavior from a different perspective, asking whether trademarks' ability to harness consumers' biases might
sometimes harm consumer interests.
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non-rational) ways. 16 These features can help to explain not only
the phenomenon of brand attraction but also the stickiness of consumer loyalty to particular brands.17 Equipped with this understanding, we can better assess whether consumers might benefit
from making different purchasing decisions and whether the law
has any role to play in helping them.
This Essay complements the rich-and growing-literature
considering the relationship between contemporary trademark
law and consumer welfare.1 8 Much of this literature focuses on the
harms that expansive trademark law poses to consumer interests
such as speech, autonomy, and product choice.1 9 Scholars have proposed various responses to these threats, ranging from adjustments to the standard for infringement, 20 to shoring up defenses,21
to narrowing the scope of trademark subject matter, 22 to eliminat23
ing the recently-added anti-dilution right.
This Essay considers the consumer/trademark relationship
from a different perspective. It seeks to identify some of the cognitive mechanisms through which trademarks, in collaboration with
advertising, may skew consumer decisions away from what rational self-interest might suggest. 24 Because these effects can occur even with narrowly-drawn trademark subject matter and
16.
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics
and Biases, SC. MAG., Sept. 27, 1974, at 1124 (stating that people rely on heuristics to
simplify decision-making) [hereinafter Judgment Under Uncertainty].
17.
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 35 (explaining the heuristic underlying the status quo bias).
18.
See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 3, at 819-20; Michael Grynberg, TrademarkLitigation
as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 71-72 (2008); Heymann, supra note 12, at
659-60; Lunney, supra note 2, at 421.
19.
See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 2, at 486-87 (stating that the expansion of trademark law has harmed consumers and the public interest more generally).
20.
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1672-73 (2007) (proposing "trademark use"
requirement in infringement suits); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 450 (2010) (advocating threshold materiality requirement); Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademarkand FalseAdvertising
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1360, 1366 (2011) (proposing that courts reconcile trademark
and false advertising law by, among other things, requiring materiality for both).
21.
E.g., William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2267, 2299 (2010) (suggesting safe harbors to protect certain speech-related uses of trademarks).
22.
E.g., Lunney, supra note 2, at 435-46 (concluding that trademark protection for
product design causes more harm than good and should be abolished); Kenneth L. Port, The
"Unnatural"Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?,
85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 574-75 (1995) (arguing against an anti-dilution amendment to
the Lanham Act).
23.
See Port, supra note 22, at 574-75.
24.
For a discussion of the numerous ways in which heuristics result in systematic
bias, see infra Section III.B.
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scope, they deserve separate attention. 25 A better understanding
of these effects may enable a more informed conversation about
whether we should worry about them. 26 It also might suggest legal,
regulatory, or educational mechanisms to soften or counter some
of the more pernicious effects of trademarks without compromis27
ing consumer autonomy.
II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF TRADEMARK LAW

Despite an active debate over its legitimacy, 28 the economic
explanation for trademark law has dominated both judicial and
scholarly accounts of the law in recent decades. 29 Under this
model, trademark law exists to promote informational accuracy in
markets, with the ultimate aim of making those markets more
competitive. 30 Trademarks, the story goes, convey information to
consumers about the source and quality of products bearing a
25.
Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 515, 529-30 (2008) (explaining that even "conceptually weak,
diluted marks" can affect consumer behavior in certain contexts).
26.
For a discussion of the implications of cognitive biases on current trademark theory, see infra Part IV.
27.
Cf.Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1382 (2015) (discussing legal tools to counter technology-enabled
exploitation of consumers).
28.
See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Bounded by Brands:An Information Network Approach
to Trademarks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 826 (2014); Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of
Trademarks, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 823, 860 (2007) (contending that "[tihe economic approach" to trademarks "has ...gradually undermined and unsettled what was once a rich
and normatively-driven body of law"); McKenna, supra note 14, at 75 (contending that the
persuasive function of trademarks dominates their informative function); Mark P.
McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67,
74-75 (2012); Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 794 (2012) (explaining
that the economic theory of trademark law is an incomplete explanation of the policy underlying status confusion cases); cf. Beebe, supra note 14, at 2025, 2060 (describing the
"neoclassical orthodoxy" as "essentially frivolous"); Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The
Linguisticand Trust Functionsof Trademarks,2010 BYU L. REV. 1555, 1607-08 (proposing
a modified version of the economic model that distinguishes between the "linguistic function" and the "trust function" of trademarks).
29.
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (noting that
trademark law "reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions" and "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the
financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product." (internal citations omitted)); Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099, 2105 (2004); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search
Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 786 (2004) [hereinafter Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs]; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The MerchandisingRight: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466 (2005) [hereinafter The Merchandising
Right]; Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523,
526 (1988); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 285 (1987).
30.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 270 (explaining that trademarks reduce
consumer search costs).
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mark.3 1 Because they can rely on these signals, consumers can
spend less time researching every product that they buy, which
reduces transaction costs and enhances competition. 32 It also
makes firms willing to invest in quality products with the
knowledge that they can protect their reputations against imposters. 33 To serve their function, of course, trademarks need legal protection. 34 If competitors could mimic trademarks with impunity,
marks would lose their meaning, and firms would wastefully allocate resources to ensure that consumers know what they are buying.35 The "search costs" theory of trademark law thus presumes
that by reducing consumer search costs, trademark laws can pro36
mote a more efficient, competitive economy.
Like any economic model, this one relies on certain assumptions about the behavior and preferences of individuals and firms.
It treats consumers as rational actors who have ordered preferences and act on them consistently; consumer decisions are assumed to maximize the utility that comes from those preferences. 37
Utility, in this model, is measured by willingness to pay, not the
actual benefit derived from the purchase.3 8 Thus, although consumers can learn from their experiences with prior transactions,
their utility from the present transaction turns on how much they
pay.39 The model leaves no room for inquiry into whether the purchase lived up to that valuation or whether some unknown alternative might have served equally well (or better).
To complement this rational view of consumers, the economic
model assumes that the "information" revealed through trademarks helps consumers to identify products with features that
31.
Trademarks initially indicated source explicitly, but consumers today rely on
trademarks primarily for information about product features and quality, which-of
course--depend upon consistency of source. See Economides, supra note 29, at 527 ("Presently the trademark typically identifies the product (the full combination of features that
constitute the product), and its role of identifying the source is secondary in the minds of
consumers.").
32.
See McKenna, supra note 28, 73-74 (2012) (explaining the "search costs" theory
of trademark law).
33.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 270 (explaining that firms would have no
incentive to invest in quality products if free-riders could legally duplicate trademarks).
34.
Id.
35.
Cf. Brown, supra note 1, at 1169 (asserting that money spent on convincing consumers to pick one product over its brand-name equivalent is a waste of resources).
36.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 269 (explaining that trademark law promotes efficiency by saving consumer search costs and encourages expenditures on product
quality).
37.
See Thomas S. Uien, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON. 790, 791 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Gees eds., 2000).
38.
See Brown, supra note 1, at 1181 (stating that the utility of goods is measured by
what people will pay for it).
39.
Id.
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meet their objective needs. 40 Advertising, in this view, serves an
informational function; consumers rely on the combination of adto shape opinions
vertising, word of mouth, and direct experience 41
mark.
a
bearing
and preferences about products
The search-costs model has come under attack in recent years
from critics who charge it with everything from naivet6 to complete responsibility for trademark law's twentieth-century expansion.42 The full scale of the critique goes beyond the scope of this
Essay, but two points bear mention. First, because the model conditions trademark rights on the existence of a source-identifying
signal, it tolerates a broad range of trademark subject matter,
from words to logos to product features and sounds. 43 Critics question whether the informational benefits of such wide-ranging
trademarks outweigh their costs, particularly when it comes to
protection of product features. 44 Second, some complain that the
model's obsession with confusion leads to over-broad trademark
rights and a chill on behavior that may benefit consumers. 45 While
these concerns about the subject matter and scope of trademark
rights deserve attention, they arguably involve questionable extensions of the economic model, rather than faithful application of
it. The model itself seeks to promote competition, not restrain it;
indeed, trademark law has limiting doctrines to block claims that

See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search Costs Theory of Limiting Doc40.
trines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1226 (2007) (explaining that trademarks tell a consumer that a particular good has the features they are seeking).
It bears emphasis that this product-related information has value regardless of
41.
its source. Consumers benefit as much (indeed, sometimes more) from third-party reviews
and criticism of branded products as they do from information conveyed by trademark holders themselves. Because this information, too, can facilitate consumer search and promote
better-informed markets, the economic model welcomes it. See, e.g., id. ('Trademarks work
as signifiers precisely because they are a particularly efficient means of conveying information. They are useful in making comparisons for the same reason.").
See sources cited supra note 28 (challenging the legitimacy of the economic expla42.
nation of trademark law).
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) ('We can43.
not find in the basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the
use of color alone as a trademark, where that color has attained 'secondary meaning' and
therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand (and thus indicates its 'source').").
Particularly with respect to product configuration marks, these costs include chill
44.
in the introduction of competing products. See Bone, supra note 29, at 2183-84; Lunney,
supra note 2, at 428.
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, DevelopingDefenses in TrademarkLaw, 13 LEWIS
45.
& CLARK L. REV. 99, 120 (2009); Grynberg, supra note 18, at 110 (proposing that courts
consider consumer interests on both sides of the ledger in trademark litigation); Heymann,
supranote 12, at 656; William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn't Everything,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 300 (2013) (advocating that courts single out some types of
cases for "different treatment because they systematically implicate important competition
or communication values').
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would have the opposite effect. 46 In any event, the economic
model's core insight-that legal protection of trademarks enables
consumers to rely on these signals for information about products-does not mandate unlimited subject matter or scope. 47 The
fact that trademarks may impose costs as well as benefits has implications for the shape of trademark law but not for its existence;
nor does it discredit the basic premise of the economic model that
some form of trademark protection is essential to a functioning
48
competitive market.
III. COMPLICATIONS
While the economic model offers a rationale for trademark
protection and capably explains many trademark doctrines, 49 its
reliance on rational choice theory leaves it ill-equipped to address
consumer decisions that appear incompatible with their utilitymaximizing self-interest. In particular, the model fails to contemplate that trademarks might influence people to make purchasing
decisions that might not bring them the highest quality goods at
the lowest available price-i.e., the selection of the hypothetical
rational actor. 50 This apparent discrepancy can come in different
forms, which may have different implications for trademark theory and doctrine.
Costly shortcuts. In some markets, consumers appear to use
trademarks as a proxy for objective product quality that may or
may not be warranted. 51 Take over-the-counter pharmaceuticals.
If we asked people, in the abstract, to identify their goals in purchasing pharmaceutical products, most would say that they want
high-quality goods at the lowest possible price. Studies demonstrate that health care professionals, educated people, and pharmacists choose generic drugs over branded drugs by a wide margin, no doubt because they know that generics offer the same
chemical ingredients and therapeutic effect at a significantly lower
price. As we move away from these sophisticated audiences, however, the preference for generics drops dramatically. 52 If we assume that these better-informed purchasers are making "rational"

46.
See generally Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 29, at 786-99.
47.
Id. at 795.
48.
See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 40, at 1226; Lunney, supra note 2, at
427-28.
49.
See Dogan & Lemley, supranote 40, at 1234.
50.
See Bart J. Bronnenberg et al., Do PharmacistsBuy Bayer? Informed Shoppers
and the Brand Premium, 130 Q. J. ECON. 1669, 1690 (2015).
51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 1700.
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utility-maximizing decisions, trademarks in this market are arguably having the opposite of their intended effect, inhibiting information flow and frustrating competition rather than promoting it.
By using the trademark as a proxy for quality, in other words, lessinformed consumers appear to be consistently over-paying for oth53
erwise equivalent products.
The model responds to these concerns in two ways. First, it
assumes a priori that the less-informed consumers receive some
benefit from paying a higher price for the branded product. In the
pharmaceutical context, for example, a consumer might derive
utility from her confidence in the firm's reputation as a reliable
manufacturer.5 4 Second, to the extent that better information
might reduce the consumer's preference for the higher-cost product, the model contemplates legal doctrines that allow access to
such information. 55 Competitors and third parties, for example,
may use trademarks to call attention to equivalents, imitations, or
other alternatives to the trademarked good. 56 In this way, the
model assumes that over time, consumer decisions will gravitate
in a utility-maximizing direction. As the persistent price gap in the
over-the-counter pharmaceutical market demonstrates, however,
57
this assumption is a contestable one.
Hedonic consumption. Whereas costly shortcuts appear to result from a stubborn information gap, a second form of apparently
non-rational consumer behavior-what I call hedonic consump-

Cf. Am. Safety Razor Corp. v. Int'l Safety Razor Corp., 26 F.2d 108, 114 (D.N.J.
53.
1928), rev'd, 34 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1929) (expressing this concern).
Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 275 ('The fact that two goods have the same
54.
chemical formula does not make them of equal quality to even the most coolly rational consumer. That consumer will be interested not in the formula but in the manufactured product and may therefore be willing to pay a premium for greater assurance that the good will
actually be manufactured to the specifications of the formula."); cf. Bone, supra note 29, at
2116 ("Just because advertising creates new preferences in addition to supplying information to help satisfy preferences already formed does not mean that the induced preferences are 'irrational' or 'bad' or that they should count as a social cost in considering
whether to protect the mark. In order to draw this conclusion, one needs a normative theory
of good and bad preferences, and any such theory is difficult to defend in a nonpaternalistic
way."); Richard Schmalansee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon
Case, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994, 1037 (1979) (noting that consumers might purchase namebrands as "a sensible way of reducing perceived risk" of a sub-standard purchase).
55.
Bone, supra note 29, at 2116.
56.
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 40, at 1234.
57.
It is no response, moreover, to return to the first point: that consumers derive
utility from their confidence in the brand's reputation. An information transmission model
of trademarks assumes that consumers benefit from accurateinformation that trademarks
convey about the source and qualities of products. If better-informed consumers are consistently opting in favor of generics, then the confidence that less-informed consumers have
in the branded version is misplaced. Id. at 1226.
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tion-involves a more complicated relationship between consumers, trademarks, and products. 58 Research has shown that consumers often experience distinct pleasure from knowing that they
are buying, consuming, or experiencing a trademarked version of
a good. 59 The canonical example involves Coca-Cola. In repeated
experiments, Coke drinkers show not only verbally expressed preferences, but a measurable difference in brain response, when presented with a drink labeled Coca-Cola in comparison to an unlabeled version of the very same liquid.60 Status goods, too, involve
a form of hedonic consumption: consumers who buy, use, and wear
them derive pleasure from the experience-a pleasure that is distinct from whatever benefits they receive from the physical, non61
trademark aspects of the product.
Hedonic consumption sits uncomfortably with the economic
model of trademark law with its presumed dichotomy between
trademarks and the products they denote. 62 When the trademark
becomes a salient feature of the product itself-i.e., when it becomes part of the product's value (and therefore its purchase
price), independent of its function as a source-indicator-the effect
of trademark protection on competition becomes more ambiguous. 63 If consumers relish the feeling of drinking a Coke because
it's a Coke, rather than because they know Coke denotes a particular drink product, Coke's exclusivity in the mark gives it a competitive advantage beyond that contemplated by the search-costs
model. 64 At the same time, hedonic consumption, unlike persistent
costly shortcuts, does not necessarily reflect a glitch in the information model, at least from the perspective of consumer utility. If
the trademark really enhances the consumer's experience of the
Irina Manta embraces hedonic consumption as a social good, and she urges that
58.
hedonic utility be included explicitly in the economic model. See Manta, supra note 9, at
248.
Id. at 248-49.
59.
See, e.g., Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference
60.
for Culturally FamiliarDrinks, 44 NEURON 379, 382-85 (2004) (describing differences in
both expressed preferences and MRI-measured neural activity when subjects were presented with unbranded versus branded colas in taste tests).
61.
See generally Sheff, supra note 28, at 794 (explaining the effect of status good
purchases on consumers).
Cf. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV.
62.
621, 624 (2004) ('CThe culture industries-and what industries aren't?-have long sold
trademarks as commodities in their own right."); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroadsof Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 125 n.63
(2005) ('Trademarks have in some instances become the commodities themselves rather
than signifiers of a producer of the good or service, or of the product itself. For example, the
Nike swoosh is valuable separate and apart from the running shoes that were first marked
with the trademarked swoosh.').
Id. at 661-62.
63.
64.
Id. at 695.
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good, then the consumer is making a rational choice to pay more
for it, at least in the short term.
Of course, the various effects of trademarks are not mutually
exclusive; it may be that consuming Tylenol rather than generic
acetaminophen leads to similar hedonistic enjoyment as drinking
Coke rather than an unmarked sample of the very same cola. Indeed, the various functions of a trademark-accurate information
facilitation, the tendency toward costly shortcuts, and hedonic consumption-undoubtedly interact, with different factors predominating depending on the trademark and the class of product. The
resulting muddle can make it appear impossible to segregate the
various effects. But it's worth pondering what might happen if
such segregation were possible. If, for example, the law could isolate and reduce the tendency of consumers to use costly shortcuts,
it would align trademark law more closely with its competitive aspirations.
Decades of research on human decision-making may offer
some insight into these questions. In particular, research in cognitive decision theory and behavioral economics exposes a number
of specific ways in which the rational choice model fails as an accurate predictor of human behavior. 65 Repeated studies demonstrate that real people rarely behave as rational utility-maximizers; instead, they rely on a set of heuristics and biases that shape
their decisions in predictable-and predictably irrational-ways.66
Unlike hypothetical rational consumers, real consumers act with
"bounded rationality." 67 They act impulsively, favoring short-term
rewards over longer-term satisfaction. 68 They opt for stability rather than change, even when change might benefit them. 69 They
often experience a chasm between what they want and what they

65.
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99,
101 (1955).
66.
Id. at 100-01.
67.
Id.; see also Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 690 (1999).
68.
See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) ('The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function
of symbols."); Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1479 ("[Hluman beings often take actions that
they know to be in conflict with their own long-term interests."); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1843-44
(2012) (discussing welfare effects of the "present bias," in which consumers make choices
based on short-term costs and benefits, without adequate attention to long-term effects).
69.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing status quo bias); Colin
Camerer, et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
'Asymmetric Paternalism,"151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2003).
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like, even after repeated exposures.70 These studies do not disprove the essential insight of law and economics-that people behave in predictable ways and that the law both shapes and reflects
those predilections-but they complicate our understanding of
that behavior. As Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler explain in their canonical article: "The task of behavioral law
and economics, simply stated, is to explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for the law."7 1 As such, it's
worth considering whether the insights of behavioral economics
have implications for the economic model of trademarks.
Why bother using the language of behavioral economics to
confirm intuitions that date back to the early days of advertising?
Legal scholars, economists, and others have long observed the tendency of advertising to shape consumer preferences in ways that
appear inconsistent with their best interests; 72 what, if anything,
does behavioral economics add to that picture? A possible answer
lies in the discipline's relationship to traditional economic models
of law. Rather than rejecting the economic framework as a tool of
legal analysis, behavioral law and economics strive for "an approach to the economic analysis of the law that is informed by a
more accurate conception of choice, one that reflects a better understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings." 73 Behavioral
economics, in other words, seeks to improve, rather than supplant,
economic models of the law.74 It does so by formalizing a model of
human decision-making that diverges from the rational actor
model in specific and predictable ways. 75 As such, the discipline
provides an empirically-based response to the trope that all consumer decisions are, by definition, utility-maximizing and rational. 76 By unpacking the factors that motivate consumers to act,

See Camerer, supra note 11, at 90-91.
70.
Jolls et al., supranote 67, at 1476-77. This article was among the first to consider
71.
the law-and-economics implications of the groundbreaking work on consumer decision theory pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. See Judgment Under Uncertainty,
supra note 16, at 1128. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES 1-16 (2000) (introducing concepts of consumer decision theory).
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1, at 1172; Sigmund Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monop72.
oly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 323, 323 (Spring 1949)
("Successful trade-marks... are largely matters of giving conventional forms of syllabification and ornamentation a reiteration prolonged and attractive enough to evoke a conditioned reflex on the part of their audience-the so-called consumer response. It was Judge
Learned Hand, and no crusading sociologist, who said in a trade-mark case that 'The art of
advertising spuriously reinforced a genuine demand by the power of reiterated suggestion.'"
(quoting Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 962 (2d Cir. 1918))).
73.
Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1473.
Id. at 1523.
74.
75.
Id. at 1524.
76.
Id. at 1488 ("If rationality is used to mean simply that people 'choose' what they
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it also offers the possibility of harnessing those factors to improve
outcomes. 77
For the economic model of trademark law, behavioral economics (along with its precursor and psychology-based counterpart,
cognitive decision theory) allows us to interrogate the assumption
that consumers rely on trademarks in utility-enhancing ways. To
that end, consider the following insights about consumer decision78
making.
A.

Consumers Rely on PredictableHeuristics to Simplify
Decisions.

In an important (and Nobel Prize-winning) body of work on
consumer decision theory, the psychologists Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman provided the framework and foundations for
the field of behavioral economics. 79 Through a series of experiments, Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated that, in the face of
uncertainty, "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations."8 0 People, in
other words, use mental shortcuts to guide their decisions. These
heuristics save time and mental energy but can also "lead to severe
and systematic errors."8'
Tversky and Kahneman identified three common heuristics
used by consumers in gauging probabilities and estimating values.8 2 The Representativenessheuristic leads people to make judgments not by assessing objective probabilities, but based on assumptions about the relationships between a concept and

'prefer' in light of the prevailing incentives, then the notion of rationality offers few restrictions on behavior. The person who drinks castor oil as often as possible is rational because she happens to love castor oil. Other self-destructive behavior (drug addiction, suicide, etc.) can be explained on similar grounds. It is not even clear on this view whether
rationality is intended as a definition of 'preference' or as a prediction."); cf. Schmalansee,
supra note 54, at 1041 & n.203 (1979) ("If consumers are irrational in any deep sense, the
welfare-economic case for competition breaks down.").
77.
See infra Part III.
78.
The combination of psychological and economic research has yielded a rich body
of scholarship regarding the nature of human decisions and other behavior; this Essay emphasizes only a small slice of the research that has particular salience for trademark law.
For a more thorough exploration see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 19-20; Hanson
& Kysar, supranote 67, at 646-54; Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1541; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The UncertainPsychologicalCase for Paternalism,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1169-70 (2003).
79.
Judgment Under Uncertainty,supra note 16, at 1124.
80.
Id. at 1124.
81. Id.
82.
Id.
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something they know.8 3 People may assess the likelihood of a person's profession, for example, based on the extent to which she fits
some stereotype of that profession without regard to how many
84
people actually work in that profession relative to alternatives.
Under the Availability heuristic, people evaluate risk (or opportunity) based on how readily examples of the hypothetical event
come to mind.85 This heuristic leads to inflated estimates of familiar, memorable, widely reported, or graphic sorts of events.8 6 Finally, Anchoring drives people to approach decisions from some
starting point, and adjust from there.8 7 This heuristic demonstrates the power of defining that starting point; settlement negotiations, for example, tend to result in higher settlements if the
plaintiff begins with a big number.88 All of these heuristics show
the importance of framing.8 9 The way that choices or propositions
are framed can have a profound influence on outcomes. 90
B. HeuristicsProduce Systematic and PredictableBiases.
Although Tversky and Kahneman's project began as an exploration of the human decision-making process from a psychological
perspective, it had a profound impact on scholarship in economics
and law because it called into question the foundational principle
of rational choice. 91 In their own work, Tversky and Kahneman
described numerous ways in which their heuristics resulted in systematic bias, and others have refined and extended their findings.
For purposes of trademark law, a handful of biases have particular
92
salience.
Status quo bias. Rational choice theory would predict that
people re-evaluate their choices on an ongoing basis, adjusting
their preferences in response to new information. 93 In reality, however, humans have a remarkable propensity to stick with the status quo, even when switching costs are negligible and in the face

Id.
83.
84.
Id.; see also Rachlinski, supra note 78, at 1171 (discussing examples).
85.
Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 16, at 1127.
Id.
86.
Id. at 1128.
87.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supranote 10, at 33.
88.
Id. at 36.
89.
90.
Id.
91.
See generally Rachlinski, supra note 78, at 1169-70.
Scholars have identified other biases that have special relevance in contexts such
92.
as juror deliberations. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post e Ex Ante:
Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 91 (1995) (discussing hindsight bias).
93.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 34.
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of objectively superior options. 94 As a result, starting points-the
first-time purchase of a product, the initial options in an investment portfolio--matter far more than the rational model would
95
predict.
Conformity. People tend to conform to others' views, even
when the facts are available and conflict directly with that consensus. 96 Of course, relying on the views of other people is often rational, to the extent that those others have better information and
can thus reduce the decision-maker's costs. 97 Research on conformity, however, shows that it occurs without regard to the merits of
the adopted view and is largely immune to correction. 98 Groupthink and strong personalities play a special role here. People
show a strong tendency toward group opinions even if they are
clearly wrong9 9 and show a similar inclination toward views of
"confiden[t,] ... consistent and unwavering" people. 10 0 Relatedly,
perceptions of the widespread use of certain behavior can normalize that behavior, and perceptions that few people engage in the
behavior has the opposite effect. 10 1
Confirmation bias. Repeated studies have demonstrated that
once someone settles on a point of view, she tends to interpret all
evidence in a way that supports that point of view-even evidence
that refutes it.102 As a result, time and experience reinforce existing beliefs, thus further entrenching errors rather than correcting
them.103 As Matthew Rabin and Joel Schrag describe it, "even an
infinite amount of information does not necessarily overcome the
effects of confirmatory bias: over time an agent may with positive

94.
Id. at 35; Camerer et al., supra note 69, at 1224 ('People are much more likely to
stick with existing policies, consumption bundles, legislators, and so on than normative
theories would predict, even when the costs of switching are very low.").
95.
Status quo bias complements a related bias, loss aversion, in which people fear
loss more than they appreciate gains of identical value. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 10, at 34 (describing status quo bias and loss aversion as contributors to "inertia").
96.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 56-58.
97.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 56-58.
98.
99.
See generally Ranxi Jiang & Stella C. Chia, The Direct and Indirect Effects of
Advertisingon Materialismof College Students in China, 19 ASIANJ. COMM. 319, 319 (2009)
(concluding that advertising affects Chinese college students both directly (by creating individual materialist desires) and indirectly (by shaping peer group norms in a materialistic
direction)).
100.

THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 58.

101.
Id. at 67-68.
102.
Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter:A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q. J. ECON. 37, 46-47 (1999).
103.
Id. at 47-49.
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probability come to believe with near certainty in the wrong hy104
pothesis."
Optimism bias (and related self-serving biases). Optimism
and other self-serving biases give people an unduly sunny view of
their own abilities and prospects. 10 5 Although these delusions appear critical to our mental health, 10 6 they can reinforce existing
preferences and thus exacerbate the effects of other errors in judgment. As Jeffrey Rachlinski explains:
[P]lacing a high degree of confidence in a judgment made in
heavy reliance on a misleading heuristic compounds matters.
Excess confidence impedes individuals' ability to learn from
mistakes and improve their ability to make better decisions.
It might also undermine basic goals of the legal system by
clouding the signals that law is trying to send to legal ac10 7
tors.
C. Temporal ConsiderationsProvide Insight About Consumer
Decision-making.
While decision heuristics and cognitive biases help to explain
the direction of diversions from the rational-actor model, another
(related) set of complications comes from the model's use of a pointin-time valuation of utility.1 08 By assuming that price captures the
utility derived from a purchase, the model ignores the fact that
consumers' long-term interests may conflict with their short-term
desires.10 9 As Cass Sunstein puts it:
A growing literature explores the difference between
"decision utility" and "experienced utility"-the difference
between the utility that we think we will get when we
make a decision and the utility we actually experience after that decision has been made. The central finding is
that at the time of decision, people think that they will
obtain a certain amount of utility, or welfare, from certain
products or activities-but they sometimes err. 110
The error may come from impulsive behavior that they come

104.
Id. at 38; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 67, at 648.
105.
See Rachlinski, supra note 78, at 1173.
106.
Studies have shown that people who lack the optimism bias tend toward depression. See C.W. Korn et al., Depression is Related to an Absence of Optimistically Biased
Belief UpdatingAbout FutureLife Events, 44 PSYCHOL. MED. 579, 589 (2014).
107.
Rachlinski, supra note 78, at 1173.
108.
See Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1488.
109.
Id. at 1539.
110.
Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1875.
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to regret,1 11 from a mismatch between "wants" and "likes" that resists correction (often through operation of the biases discussed
above), 112 or from addiction or other mechanisms that block their
113
self-control.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

How does this understanding of human decision-making complicate the search-costs model? And with what implications?
At the very least, it challenges the notion that purchase price
fully captures the utility that a consumer derives from a trademarked product or service. In particular, to the extent that consumers pay more for products bearing a well-known trademark
than for less-expensive equivalents, behavioral economics offers a
number of explanations that have little to do with utility.1 1 4 By
harnessing decisional heuristics and leveraging consumer bias,
advertisers can attract consumers to products bearing their mark;
having arrived, status quo bias, confirmation bias, and optimism
bias create a strong presumption that the consumer will stick with
that product.1 15 And patents and other forms of exclusive rights
only exacerbate these effects because they give the seller a head
start to attract consumers and establish purchasing habits.
The behavioral economics literature, in other words, offers a
persuasive explanation for the existence, persistence, and consequences of costly shortcuts. And it suggests that these shortcuts
can result in substantial and enduring over-payment by consumers. 116 A robust economic model of trademark law should contemplate these costs alongside trademarks' benefits in facilitating consumer search. 1 7 And it should consider tools that might reduce
those costs while preserving trademarks' informational benefits.118
The same decision characteristics help to explain the phenomenon of hedonic consumption, although the implications for the

See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism,60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323,
111.
360 (2008) (discussing compulsive buying and possibility of regulating businesses that encourage people to make compulsive decisions that they later regret).
112.
See Camerer, supra note 11, at 91 ("My suggestion .. is that the wanting-learning-liking distinction provides a potential basis, grounded in neuroscience, for asserting
that choices are not always utility-maximizing.").
113.
See id. at 98-99.
See infra Part III.A.
114.
115.
See infra Part IH.B.
116.
Am. Safety Razor Corp. v. Int'l Safety Razor Corp., 26 F.2d 108, 114 (D.N.J. 1928),
rev'd, 34 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1929).
117.
See generally infra Part III.B.
See generally infra Part V.
118.
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economic model are less clear. Through imagery, celebrity endorsements, and other tools, advertisers can create powerful emotional connections between consumers and brands. To the extent
that consumers derive pleasure from buying and consuming these
products-as opposed to reflexively choosing them out of habitthe decision may well look rational and utility-maximizing, at
least in the moment. 119 Yet here too the assumption of rationality
may overlook the broader context in which "wants" do not always
translate into long-term satisfaction and material consumption
does not always yield its anticipated benefits over time. However,
given the near-impossibility of comparing the temporary and enduring satisfaction from particular purchases, there is no plausible way to measure the net effect of trademark-focused hedonistic
consumption. 120
This understanding does not discredit the notion that trademarks reduce consumer search costs and thus promote competition in certain ways. 121 But it recognizes that some trademarks
may impose costs that counteract those savings. 122 Understanding
the forces that lead to those effects may open a conversation about
strategies to counteract them. This doesn't necessarily mean that
the law should intervene; it may well be that to get the benefit of
the informational function of trademarks we have to live with their
downsides. 123 Paternalism concerns, moreover, counsel in favor of
124
caution, even if intervention might leave consumers better off.
A richer understanding of consumer behavior, however, requires
engagement with the costs and benefits of doing something, rather
125
than waving the flag of paternalism as an excuse for inaction.
119.
See Manta, supranote 9, at 263 (discussing how consumers receive other hedonic
values from trademarked products beyond the experience of consuming the actual product).
120.
See Edwards, supra note 111, at 362 ("[fIn cases of conflict between a present self
and future selves, regulators must articulate a principle to mediate conflict between multiple selves. Not only might it be hard to elaborate such a principle, but the notion of having
regulators choose which of our different selves are making the right choices starts to look a
lot like the bad old 'hard paternalism' that the new paternalism seeks to avoid.").
121.
See sources cited supra note 29; cf.Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and
the Rational Basis for ProtectingIrrationalBeliefs, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605, 623 (2007)
(contending that trademarks not only economize on consumers' search costs and minimize
consumer errors, but also impact the product's demand and sales); Edwards, supra note
111, at 640 (explaining how trademark allows for different labels and different prices, enabling "competition in the market for psychological freight").
122.
See Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 29, at 788 (noting some
of the economic costs associated with trademark protection, particularly in markets dominated by one or more well-known brands).
123.
Id. at 788 (recognizing the need to maintain the "informative role of trademarks
while minimizing [the] downside risks").
124.
See Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1545 (noting that government intervention in
markets is often "likely to make things worse rather than better").
Id. at 1541 (urging decision-makers to take empirically supported understandings
125.
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V. THE CASE FOR PATERNALISM?
As the field of behavioral economics has matured, so has the
discourse about whether-and how-government should take
steps to protect consumers against their own irrational propensities. 126 The debate is really over whether the government has any
role to play; even the strongest advocates for a behavioral approach would rarely mandate outcomes or deprive consumers of
freedom of choice.127 Many behavioral law-and-economics scholars
believe in a form of paternalism-i.e., some form of government
intervention in consumer decisions in order to help consumers
make better choices. 128 Their proposals, however, are incremental
and focused principally on improving the decision-making process
rather than dictating results. 29 At the same time, they challenge
the refusal of anti-paternalists to even consider the possibility of
helping consumers to make better decisions. 130 "Behavioral economists generally favor paternalism about means, not ends. Most of
their key findings involve human errors with respect to means;
their goal is to create choice architecture that will make it more
likely that people will promote their own ends."1 31 They view their
project not as advocating paternalism, but as "anti-antipaternalism-a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative
defense of paternalism"' 32-at least paternalism of the strongest
sort.

of human behavior into account in making policy).
126.
See id. at 1543 (noting that government intervention is not immune to the same
problems that affect citizens).
127.
Id. at 1541 (contending that citizens are the "best judges" of how to promote their
own welfare, at least in contrast to government decisionmakers).
128.
See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism,THE STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOS. ARCHIVE,
https:/Hplato.stanford.eduarchives/win2017/entries/paternalism
[http://perma.cc/MX8FW5FV] (last modified Feb. 12, 2017) (defining paternalism as "the interference of a state or
an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim
that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm').
129.
See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1845 (emphasizing the goal of improving the decision-making process by promoting self-control and freedom of choice).
130.
Id. at 1868 (dismissing certain objections to paternalism as a "form of chestthumping').
131.
Id. at 1868 (distinguishing between paternalism that dictates outcomes and paternalism that shapes the context in which people make choices); see also Rachlinski, supra
note 78, at 1219 ("[P]aternalistic interventions can often be made less intrusive by taking
advantage of the lessons of behavioral decision theory and restructuring, rather than restricting individual choice."). One of the lessons of recent work on behavioral law and economics is that the law can sometimes shape preferences without eliminating consumer autonomy or reducing consumer choice. Id. at 1195 (noting that paternalistic intervention can
"prevent the distortions that erroneous individual choices create').
132.
Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1541.
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Proponents of this kind of "soft paternalism," "means paternalism," or "libertarian paternalism" 133 suggest interventions like
debiasing, changing default rules, and other "nudges" designed to
increase the likelihood that the consumer will make a welfare-enhancing choice. 134 A classic example of soft paternalism is the use
of new default rules to require employees to opt out rather than to
opt in to their employers' retirement savings programs. 135 Employees retain the choice to contribute or not, but by making the presumption in favor of contribution, this "nudge" harnesses the status quo bias, the optimism bias, and other behaviors to make it
more likely that the consumer will end up with an outcome that
1 36
aligns with her best interests.
Even this kind of choice-preserving intervention, of course, injects the government into private affairs and therefore raises the
hackles of anti-paternalists. 137 Skeptics focus on two clusters of
concerns. First, they worry about the quality of government decisions relative to individual ones.1 38 If we can't trust individuals to
make decisions in their own best interests, the reasoning goes,
why should bureaucrats do any better? 39 Second, critics argue

133.
See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalism is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2003) (defining libertarian paternalism as "an
approach that preserves freedom of choice but that encourages both private and public institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their own welfare"); THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 5 ("[L]ibertarian paternalists urge that people should be 'free
to choose.'... The paternalistic aspect lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people's behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier,
and better.').
134.
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 72 (finding that libertarian paternalism "offer[s] nudges that are most likely to help and least likely to inflict harm").
135.
See generally Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 133, at 1195 (discussing a study
showing substantially higher participation rates when customers are automatically enrolled in retirement savings plans and must opt.out if they wish to avoid contributing).
136.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 33-34.
137.
E.g., Edward J. Glaeser, Paternalismand Psychology, 73 U. CHI.L. REV. 133, 142
(2006) (presenting models showing that "private decisions will often be more accurate than
public decisions"); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulationof Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1625-26 (2006) (suggesting
that no intervention at all will often be "more efficient than paternalistic interventions" and
contending that such intervention may worsen irrational tendencies); Wright & Ginsburg,
supra note 12, at 1062 (criticizing proposals for government intervention through the setting of default rules).
138.
See Glaeser, supra note 137, at 142 (suggesting situations in which regulators
make worse decisions than individuals); Klick & Mitchell, supra note 137, at 1661
("[Glovernment regulation intended to counter irrational tendencies may actually exacerbate the problem.").
139.
See Glaeser, supra note 137, at 144-45 (suggesting that individuals whose own
interests are at stake would make less erroneous decisions than government actors). Glaeser makes two related points: first, that individuals have a stronger motivation than governments to correct their errors in welfare-maximizing ways; and second, that the risk of
capture is greater with a small number of government decision-makers than with a diverse

290

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

56:2

that humans learn through trial, error, and correction. 140 Depriving people of the opportunity to err, the argument goes, will meddle with their personal growth and inhibit better decision-making
4
in the future.1 1
These objections, however, run into two obstacles of their own.
First, they turn on the very assumptions that behavioral economics has called into question: that even if individuals sometimes err,
they learn from those errors, and in any event, individual self-interest will do a better job with outcomes than meddlesome bureaucrats. 142 Decades of research on human decision-making, however,
demonstrate that, while individuals may well learn from errors in
some circumstances, cognitive biases may prevent them from ever
knowing that they made the wrong choice between two alternatives. 43 Second, the arguments pose a false dichotomy between individual freedom and government control. In particular, this dichotomy overlooks the fact that individual "freedom" is
manipulated all the time by private parties who harness cognitive
limitations to their own profit-maximizing ends. 144 The choice, in
other words, is not between individual freedom and government
control, but over whether or not to allow market actors to "cater to
people's frailties and to exploit them," without any counterbalance
45
or other response.1
The anti-paternalism trope rings especially hollow in light of
the modest, incremental nature of the interventions suggested by
behavioral law and economics scholars. 146 In virtually all circum-

population of consumers. Id.
140.
See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 1070-71 ("[E]ffective decisionmaking
is acquired through trial and error.'.
141.
See id. at 1036 ("[S]o long as libertarian paternalism ignores the economic welfare
and liberty value of allowing individuals the freedom to err, it will fail to achieve its goal of
increasing welfare without reducing liberty and will pose a significant risk of reducing
both."); see also Klick & Mitchell, supra note 137, at 1626 ("[R]esearch from developmental
psychology indicates that individuals improve their decision-making skills over time
through a 'learning by doing' process, and that paternalistic policies threaten interference
in this self-regulatory process."). Klick and Mitchell make the related point that substituting government judgment for individual choice raises moral hazard concerns. Id. (arguing
that paternalism reduces individuals' "motivation to act deliberately and carefully").
142.
See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1899 (proposing that some interventionalist
"cures" are worse than the individualist "disease").
143.
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining that despite being able
to learn from repeated errors, "human forecasts are flawed and biased").
See Sunstein & Thaler, supranote 133, at 1174 (observing that in the absence of
144.
government intervention, private parties would impose their own form of paternalism).
145.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 78.
146.
See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 1041 (recognizing bare minimum
needed to overcome "recurring and systematic errors'); see also Sunstein, supra note 68, at
1845 (analyzing various approaches to counter self-control problems).
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stances, these scholars propose mechanisms for shaping the decision-making process in ways that overcome common biases. Unbiased individuals-those who prove capable of distilling all relevant information and making rational decisions-will be
unaffected by these tools. 147 Even more vulnerable consumers retain the option of choosing whatever outcome they think promotes
their interests. But by shaping individuals' "choice architecture"
and framing the decision process in a way that counteracts common misunderstandings or biases, these interventions can in148
crease the likelihood of outcomes that serve people's needs.
This potential for soft paternalism-to reframe consumer decisions in a way that reduces the risk of exploitation of their biases-could prove useful in the trademark context. In particular,
it may suggest mechanisms to maintain the informational benefits
of trademarks while softening their potential to drive decisions
based on heuristics and biases rather than reason.
Consider, again, the case of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals
in which less-informed consumers show an enduring preference for
brand-name drugs.1 49 An anti-paternalist with a hard-line view of
the search-costs model would describe this as a utility-maximizing
outcome. Because less sophisticated consumers are willing to pay
the price difference in exchange for confidence in their purchase,
the cost to them of learning about any quality differential between
the brand and the generic outweighs the difference in price. 150 A
behavioral economist, on the other hand, might view this as a
suboptimal outcome resulting from the bounded rationality of consumers leading to persistent over-payment. If so, the solution is
not to dictate a different outcome, but to consider mechanisms for
debiasing decisions so that consumers can do a better job of decid1 51
ing for themselves.
While a detailed exploration of such mechanisms is beyond

147.
E.g., Camerer et al., supra note 69, at 1225 ("As long as actively making a choice
requires very little effort, the choice of defaults has essentially no effect on fully rational
consumers. But for boundedly rational people who have a status quo bias, the choice of
defaults is important.")
148.
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 92 ("A good system of choice architecture helps people to improve their ability to map and hence to select options that will make
them better off.").
149.
See Bronnenberg et al., supra note 50, at 1692 ("[G]reater knowledge of active
ingredients predicts more purchases of store brands.').
150.
See Dilbary, supra note 121, at 627 ("Consumers of branded drugs ... are buying
not only a drug or information about the drug, but also a feeling.").
151.
See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1855 (distinguishing behavioral economists from
ends paternalists because behavioral economists focus on errors and means, rather than
controlling outcomes); see also Glaeser, supra note 137, at 137 (discussing techniques to
reduce bias in contract negotiations and jury deliberations).
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the scope of this Essay, both trademark and consumer protection
laws offer some promising possibilities. 152 This might include, for
example, a more liberal approach to the use of trademarks (including logos) by those seeking to advertise competing or complementary products. 153 Additionally, lawmakers and regulators should
consider consumer protection efforts that might improve decisions
by focusing consumer attention on salient aspects of products, and
154 The Euroby teaching them better decision-making strategies.
pean Union, for example, recently adopted a Consumer Rights Information Directive that requires online sellers to disclose, and
call attention to, objective product characteristics in a way that
enables informed consumer choice.1 55 Digital intermediaries have
the potential to change consumers' choice architecture by comparing relevant features, including product ingredients and price.
could nudge consumParticularly with regulatory oversight, they
1 56
ers toward welfare-enhancing decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION

The economic model of trademark law depends on two truths
and a lie. The model assumes that trademarks convey information
(TRUE) that can save consumers time and money in finding the
products they want (TRUE). 157 The model errs, however, when it
assumes that consumers consume all available information and
See Bronnenberg et al., supra note 52, at 1717-18 (considering how the U.S. Fed152.
eral Trade Commission and European regulators use observed biased behavior to make
policy).
In the context of private label goods, some courts have allowed competitors to call
153.
attention to their cheaper products by copying certain features of an established firm's
trade dress. See Dogan & Lemley, A Search Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines,supra note
40, at 1234-35 (commending these opinions as promoting competition); Conopco, Inc. v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding no infringement when
private label retailer "packages its products in a manner to make it clear to the consumer
that the product is similar to the national brand, and is intended for the same purposes").
See Rachlinski, supra note 78, at 1168 ("Even heuristically driven individual
154.
choice can be trusted far more than legal scholars have realized, so long as individualscan
learn better decisionmakingstrategiesor delegate their choices to those who have." (emphasis added)). This suggests two alternatives for legal intervention: (1) TEACH people better
decision-making strategies; and, (2) DELEGATE-identify and support intermediaries who
can provide relevant expertise/information/defaults.
See Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
155.
October 2011 on Consumer Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive
99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive
85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2001
O.J. (L 304) 64, https://eur-lex.europa.euflegal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011L
0083&from=EN [http://perma.cc/KRY9-5MGS].
See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1310-28
156.
(2017) (noting government oversight necessary to ensure that digital intermediaries deliver
on their promise of benefits to consumers).
See supra Part II (explaining informative and functional uses of trademarks).
157.
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act on it rationally (LIE).158
By better understanding the biases that affect consumer
choice, the law can develop a more robust model of the relationship
between trademarks and consumer welfare and can adjust trademark rules to achieve a better balance between trademarks' proand anti-competitive effects.

158.

See supraPart III (addressing flaws in the rational actor assumption).
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